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IN THE WEEDS WITH THOMAS: MORSE, IN LOCO
PARENTIS, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT, AND THE
NARROWEST VIEW OF STUDENT SPEECH RIGHTS
William C. Nevin∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

In writing for the English Court of the Exchequer in the
case of Winterbottom v. Wright,1 Baron Robert Rolfe codified
into English law a maxim almost as old as the law itself. “Hard
cases, it has been frequently observed,” Rolfe wrote, “are apt to
introduce bad law.”2 In Winterbottom, Rolfe and his fellow
judges denied recovery to a plaintiff in a particularly troubling
case of negligence,3 but Rolfe’s statement—that difficult cases
with troubling facts often result in bad law—was a universal
one. As long as there have been judges, they have been forced
to contend with all too sympathetic plaintiffs desperate for
relief where the law can grant none. Giving into human nature
and bending to suit these plaintiffs, according to Rolfe, results
in bad law, either from the bench or the legislature.4

∗ Lecturer, journalism and speech at the University of West Alabama. B.A., 2007,
Communication, University of Alabama; J.D., 2010, University of Alabama School of
Law; Ph.D. candidate, 2014, Communication and Information Sciences, University of
Alabama. The author would like to thank the editors of this journal for their insights,
suggestions, and professionalism in the process of preparing this article for publication.
1
Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. of Pleas) 406; 10 M.
& W. 109, 116.
2
Id. at 116 (Rolfe, J., concurring).
3
Id. Winterbottom, the plaintiff, was hired by the postmaster to deliver mail.
Wright, the defendant, was responsible for the maintenance of the mail coach driven by
Winterbottom. After the coach collapsed, Winterbottom sued, claiming that Wright had
breached his duty of care. Rolfe and his fellow judges denied relief and found English
law allowed for either a duty of care in contract or tort—not both. The resulting precedent left consumers who were injured by defective products no redress for much of the
nineteenth century.
4
See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 905
(2006) (noting that, much like case law, legislation “made in the wake of a highly salient disaster, or made in the wake of legislative hearings featuring sympathetic victims”
is subject to “a distorted view of the nature of those controversies and the proper resolution of them.”).
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Yet there is another type of “hard case”—one where the
plaintiff is so unlikable, so flawed that even with the law on his
side, judges are tempted to stretch rulings simply to avoid
siding with such an unfortunate individual.5 In this vein of
hard cases, there have been few more difficult in the recent
history of the Supreme Court than Morse v. Frederick.6
In Morse, the Court was confronted by the thoroughly
unsympathetic Joseph Frederick,7 an eighteen-year-old high
school senior who decided to perpetrate a silly prank with his
friends so that they might get on television as the Olympic
torch relay passed through their town.8 However, their stunt,
hoisting a banner that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS,” was
promptly disrupted by their high school principal, Deborah
Morse.9
The question before the Court in Morse can be phrased
simply enough as an inquiry into whether the First
Amendment protected a banner that was blasphemous, facially
absurd, and a possible endorsement of illegal drugs.10 The
majority answered in the negative, finding the pro-drug
message was simply too much to bear.11 The majority’s
conclusion was lamentable enough for those in favor of student
speech rights, but Justice Clarence Thomas went even further
in his concurring opinion. For a while the majority at least
tried to narrow the impact of its decision,12 Justice Thomas
opined that the landmark student speech case Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District13 was “without

5
See generally David J. Salvin, The Wrongful Termination Roller Coaster, 39
ORANGE COUNTY LAWYER 16, 17 (1997) (describing a wrongful termination lawsuit
where the plaintiffs, indicted on multiple felony charges, were “very unlikeable” and
resulted in a court that “appeared motivated to find for the defendants.”).
6
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
7
Frederick’s maturity and the value (or lack thereof) in his speech is reminiscent of plaintiff Matthew Fraser’s pun-laden, sexually tinged speech before a student
assembly at the heart of Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
In Fraser, the Court found the plaintiff’s speech to be “plainly offensive” and unprotected in a school setting. Id. at 683.
8
Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115−16 (9th Cir. 2006).
9
Id. at 1115. For a full discussion of the facts, see Part Ia, infra.
10
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. at 400.
11
Id. at 403.
12
See infra Parts I, II.
13
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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basis in the Constitution.”14
Justice Thomas’s argument to sack Tinker was based
primarily on his view that student speech rights are not
supported by the earliest practices in American public schools.
In his fundamentally originalist15 concurrence, Justice Thomas
employs a wide range of historical sources to come to the
conclusion that nineteenth-century public schools did not
recognize First Amendment rights for students.16 In short, as
Justice Thomas wrote, “[T]eachers taught, and students
listened. Teachers commanded, and students obeyed. Teachers
did not rely solely on the power of ideas to persuade; they relied
on discipline to maintain order.”17 This “order,” as evidenced by
the historical support Justice Thomas gathers for his position,
was enforced by severe, often brutal forms of corporal
punishment that the justice all too easily excuses.18 Justice
Thomas grounds his claim with the legal doctrine of in loco
parentis, a principle from English common law by which
parents delegate authority over their children to the state for
the purposes of education.19 However, a cursory glance to other
documents from the period finds at least scattered opposition to
corporal punishment and carte blanche authority for school
personnel to discipline children, a contrast to the monolithic
position the Justice portrays.20 Ultimately, his conflation of free
speech rights with the ability of turn-of-the-century
schoolmasters to savagely punish the children in their care is
at best a non sequitur. Justice Thomas may be alone among his
fellow justices on the Court in his stance that children have no
rights under the First Amendment, but it is still a shocking
position to those at least nominally supportive of free
551 U.S. at 410 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See infra Part IIc, for a full exploration of Justice Thomas’ use of originalism
in his Morse concurrence.
16
551 U.S. at 412.
17
Id.
18
As Thomas writes, “the idea of treating children as though it were still the
19th century would find little support today.” Id. While he is presumably referring to
corporal punishment, he is unclear at best.
19
Id. at 413.
20
See infra notes 204–214, 219–221, 232, and accompanying text (explaining
that a historical inquiry, far from the cohesive narrative Justice Thomas presents, into
the relevant period of the mid-nineteenth century reveals a liberalization in attitudes
toward children and building opposition regarding the application of corporal punishment in public schools).
14
15
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expression.
In relying on principles of originalism for his concurring
opinion in Morse, Justice Thomas exposes a fundamental
weakness with this interpretive method in that the outcome is
driven largely by a subjective historical inquiry. Part II
examines the three mainstream opinions from Morse that,
more or less, would leave the Tinker standard for deciding
student speech cases intact.21 Part III takes up an examination
of Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion, looking at his use of
originalism and his embrace of the in loco parentis doctrine
before then examining some of the historical material the
Justice uses to support his assertions. Part III will contrast the
historical resources and cases cited by Justice Thomas with
others from the period that show an evolving attitude toward
children and a moderation of public schools. Finally, the paper
will conclude in Part IV with final thoughts on the impact of
Justice Thomas’ opinion and originalism as applied Morse.
II.

EIGHT JUSTICES AND MORSE V. FREDERICK
A.

The Majority Opinion

Chief Justice John Roberts began the majority opinion22 by
labeling the viewing of the Olympic torch relay as a “schoolsanctioned and school-supervised event” and framing Morse’s
interpretation of the banner as a pro-drug message as a
reasonable one—certainly a harbinger of unfortunate things to
come for Frederick.23 Chief Justice Roberts then laid out the
familiar student speech touchstones, moving from Tinker24 to

21
See Kenneth W. Starr, Bong Hits And The Enduring HamiltonianJeffersonian Colloquy, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2008) (“The Justices also
came together, more substantively, on the continuing vitality of Tinker. Eight of the
nine Justices would embrace the Tinker framework, and thus stare decisis values carried the day. Only Justice Thomas would have scuttled the entire enterprise and begun
anew.”).
22
The majority opinion of the Court, written by Chief Justice Roberts, was
joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Justice Thomas, again, offered
his concurrence, which will be the focus of this paper. Justice Alito wrote a concurring
opinion joined by Justice Kennedy. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment and dissented in part. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, dissented.
23
Morse, 551 U.S. at 396.
24
Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser25 and Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier,26 before concluding, “schools may
take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from
speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal
drug use.”27
The facts of the case, as Chief Justice Roberts presented
them, are relatively straightforward. As the Olympic torch
relay passed through Juneau, Alaska, Juneau-Douglas High
School Principal Deborah Morse allowed staff members and
students to leave class to observe the torch as it passed the
school.28 Students waited for the relay on both sides of the
street—one side on school grounds, the other outside of school
property.29 Frederick was “late to school that day,” as Chief
Justice Roberts writes,30 but the Ninth Circuit’s opinion made
it clear he was never actually on school grounds.31 When
Frederick did make it to the relay, he stood across the street
from the school, where “rambunctious” students were
“throwing plastic cola bottles and snowballs and scuffling with
their classmates.”32 As the torch passed, Frederick and his
friends erected a fourteen-foot banner that read, “BONG HiTS
4 JESUS”33 in order to attract attention from the television
cameras covering the relay.34 Morse then crossed the street to
demand the students take down the banner, and all but
Frederick complied.35 Frederick was subsequently suspended
for eight days under a school board policy prohibiting “public
expression that . . . advocated the use of substances that are
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
27
Morse, 551 U.S. at 397.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006). According to the circuit court, Frederick’s truancy was apparently the result of a snowed-in driveway.
32
Morse, 551 U.S. at 397. Chief Justice Roberts ultimately concluded that
Frederick was effectively a student and therefore subject to school discipline. Id. at
401. Therefore, it seems strange that the majority would point out the “rambunctious”
nature of the other students at the torch relay if indeed it was a situation where teachers and other administrators were free to enforce school discipline. In anything, the
behavior of the other students suggests that this was not a school activity and that
Frederick’s argument to that point should not have been so easily dismissed. See id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 401.
35
Id. at 398.
25
26
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illegal to minors.”36
After dismissing Frederick’s argument that the Court’s
school speech jurisprudence should not apply,37 Chief Justice
Roberts then turned to the “cryptic” message on Frederick’s
banner.38 He posits there are at least two interpretations for
the words: either a command to take drugs or a celebration of
illegal drug use. Ultimately, Chief Justice Roberts concluded
that for the purposes of the majority’s analysis, there is no
substantive difference between the two.39 Chief Justice Roberts
basically cast aside both Frederick’s argument that the phrase
was a meaningless word salad and the dissents’ view that it
represented an attempt to advance debate on drug policy as he
concluded that the banner was reasonably viewed as promoting
illegal drug use.40
With this determination of what was at least a reasonable
interpretation of a somewhat unclear banner,41 the issue for the
majority shifted from free expression and student speech rights
in the abstract to specifically whether school officials can
“restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”42 In
answering in the affirmative, Chief Justice Roberts once again
returned to the Court’s student speech jurisprudence. The
Chief Justice focused on what he found to be two central points
from Fraser: (1) students in a public school have a more limited
right to free expression as compared to adults and (2) that the
“material and substantial disruption” standard established in
36
Morse, 551 U.S. at 398 (citing App. Pet. Cert. 53a). Morse originally suspended Frederick for ten days, but the student’s punishment was reduced to time served
(eight days) by the Juneau School District superintendent.
37
Id. at 400–01. Frederick argued that since he was not on school property and
he had technically not attended school that day, then he should not be subject to school
discipline. Quoting Morse’s petition for certiorari, Chief Justice Roberts rejected the
argument, writing, “Frederick cannot ‘stand in the midst of his fellow students, during
school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and claim he is not at school.’” Id. at 401
(citation omitted).
38
Id. at 401.
39
Id. at 402.
40
Id. at 402–03.
41
See Morse, 551 U.S. at 402 (noting that there were “at least” two interpretations of the banner: an “imperative” to use illegal drugs and a celebration of drug use).
See also id. (“Gibberish is surely a possible interpretation of the words on the banner,
but it is not the only one, and dismissing the banner as meaningless ignores its undeniable reference to illegal drugs.”).
42
Id. at 403.
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Tinker is not the only frame for analysis where student speech
is concerned.43 Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that
Tinker “is not the only basis for restricting student speech,”44 as
he laid out the seriousness of the drug problem in American
schools:
The problem remains serious today. About half of American
12th graders have used an illicit drug, as have more than a
third of 10th graders and about one-fifth of 8th graders.
Nearly one in four 12th graders has used an illicit drug in the
past month. Some 25% of high schoolers say that they have
been offered, sold, or given an illegal drug on school property
within the past year . . . . Thousands of school boards
throughout the country—including JDHS—have adopted
policies aimed at effectuating this message. Those school
boards know that peer pressure is perhaps “the single most
important factor leading schoolchildren to take drugs,” and
that students are more likely to use drugs when the norms in
school appear to tolerate such behavior.45

He noted that, while Tinker prohibited the squelching of
expression due to a mere fear of disturbance, the danger with
this banner is “more serious and palpable” with “[t]he
particular concern to prevent student drug abuse . . .
extend[ing] well beyond an abstract desire to avoid
controversy.”46 The specter of illegal drugs and the possible
harmful consequences from Frederick’s banner became the
ultimate deciding issue for Chief Justice Roberts and the
majority.
In closing, Chief Justice Roberts offered some hints as to
how the majority opinion should be properly interpreted. First,
he wrote that Frederick’s banner did not merit censorship due
to its perceived offensiveness, like in Fraser; rather, because of
its “promotion of illegal drug use.”47 Chief Justice Roberts
points out, “much political and religious speech might be
perceived as offensive to some.” Considering this, it appears the
majority leaves room for possibly offensive political and
religious student speech to receive protection under the Tinker
43
44
45
46
47

Id. at 404–05.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 407–08 (citations omitted).
Id. at 408–09.
Morse, 551 U.S. at 409.
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standard.48
Chief Justice Roberts then argued that the majority opinion
and the dissent authored by Justice John Paul Stevens were
not entirely dissimilar. They differed, he noted, only on the
question of whether the banner promoted illegal drugs.49 Chief
Justice Roberts wrote, “[t]he dissent’s contrary view on that
relatively narrow question hardly justifies sounding the First
Amendment bugle.”50
Authorities
are
mixed
concerning
the
ultimate
consequences the majority opinion in Morse will have on
student speech rights.51 Some argue that Chief Justice Roberts
created an entirely new standard for examining student speech
by basing a school’s authority on its obligation to protect
students.52 This new standard could be both “amorphous” and
troubling, as at least one writer contends, due to the Court’s
interpretation of “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” as a direct call to try
illegal drugs—suggesting that school administrators are likely
to aggressively interpret student speech as harmful.53 However,
due to Chief Justice Roberts’s careful attempts to narrow the
majority opinion, Professor Mark W. Cordes believes that
Morse does not significantly erode student speech rights.54 As
Cordes writes,
What Morse once again makes clear, and what the Court has
stated in its previous decisions, is that the free speech rights
Id.
Id.
50
Id.
51
Compare Francisco M. Negron, Jr., The Unwitting Move Towards A “New”
Student Welfare Standard In Student Speech After Morse v. Frederick, 58 AM. U.L.
REV. 1221, 1224 (2009). (“Where Tinker, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, and
Fraser spoke to a school’s ability to regulate student expression with regard to disruption, curricular control, and offensive language, in Morse, the Court premised its rule
on none of these bases specifically, but rather it articulated the school’s interest as one
that involves its ability to safeguard or protect student well-being.”) and Charles Chulack, The First Amendment Does Not Require Schools to Tolerate Student Expression
That Contributes to the Dangers of Illegal Drug Use: Morse v. Frederick, 46 DUQ. L.
REV. 521, 536 (2008) with Mark W. Cordes, Making Sense of High School Speech After
Morse v. Frederick, 17 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 657, 660 (2009) (“[A] close reading
of Morse suggests that viewpoint restrictions on core speech will certainly be subject to
the Tinker standard, in which schools can prohibit speech only when it poses a very
real threat to substantially interfere with school operations or would infringe on the
rights of other students.”).
52
Negron, supra note 51, at 1224.
53
Chulack, supra note 51, at 536.
54
See Cordes, supra note 51, at 660, 679.
48
49
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of high school students must be analyzed in light of the
special characteristics and purpose of public high schools.
This is neither remarkable nor disconcerting. Schools don’t
exist to facilitate free speech, but rather to educate students,
and students’ free speech interests must be tailored to a
school’s unique environment. . . . [A] close reading of Morse
suggests that viewpoint restrictions on core speech will
certainly be subject to the Tinker standard, in which schools
can prohibit speech only when it poses a very real threat to
substantially interfere with school operations or would
infringe on the rights of other students.55

Ultimately, Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion that is
both narrow and almost entirely predicated upon the fact that
Frederick’s banner contained a reference to illegal drugs.
However, other members of the Court took issue with both the
Chief Justice’s conclusion and its scope.
B.

Justice Alito’s Concurring Opinion

On its face, the concurring opinion by Justice Samuel Alito
appears to be an effort to narrow the majority’s holding while
explaining some of Justice Alito’s beliefs regarding student
speech rights. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Anthony
Kennedy, began his opinion by stating his belief that the
majority’s decision “goes no further than to hold that a public
school may restrict speech that a reasonable observer would
interpret as advocating illegal drug use.”56 He further stated
that the opinion “provides no support for any restriction of
speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any
political or social issue.”57 Furthermore, according to Justice
Alito, this prohibition on the regulation of student speech
would be extended to cover expression on the “war on drugs” or
“legalizing marijuana for medicinal uses.”58
In discussing student speech jurisprudence, Justice Alito
both began with the assertion that Tinker was rightly decided
and that administrators are not due unquestioned deference
when making decisions regarding student speech.59 He
55
56
57
58
59

Id. at 660.
Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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concluded, however, that Bethel and Hazelwood allow for the
censorship of speech outside of the rigorous “substantial
disruption” standard,60 but he again cautioned that he joined
the majority opinion only on the understanding that the
decision does not call for any further regulation of student
speech due to the “special characteristics” of public schools.61
Justice Alito also refuted the argument that the First
Amendment allows school administrators to censor any speech
that disrupts a school’s “educational mission,” writing
[t]he “educational mission” of the public schools is defined by
the elected and appointed public officials with authority over
the schools and by the school administrators and faculty. As a
result, some public schools have defined their educational
missions as including the inculcation of whatever political
and social views are held by the members of these groups. . . .
The “educational mission” argument would give public school
authorities a license to suppress speech on political and social
issues based on disagreement with the viewpoint expressed.
The argument, therefore, strikes at the very heart of the First
Amendment.62

Justice Alito next rejected a key assertion from Justice
Thomas’ concurrence—namely that school administrators act
in loco parentis in regard to student discipline.63 “It is a
dangerous fiction,” Justice Alito wrote, “to pretend that parents
simply delegate their authority—including their authority to
determine what their children may say and hear—to public
school authorities.”64 Parents, he argued, have no real choice in
whether to send their children to public schools, and they have
little chance to control what happens in the school setting—
thereby making the in loco parentis argument inappropriate.65
However, if Justice Alito’s intention was to narrow the
scope of the majority’s decision, he unnecessarily got in his own
way66 when he stated that any alteration of the “usual free
Id. at 422–23.
Id. at 423.
62
Morse, 551 U.S. at 423.
63
Id. at 424.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
See Clay Calvert, Misuse and Abuse of Morse v. Frederick by Lower Courts:
Stretching the High Court’s Ruling Too Far to Censor Student Expression, 32 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2008).
60
61
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speech rules”67 in public schools must arise from a special
circumstance in the school setting. In Morse, he wrote the
circumstance was “the threat to the physical safety of
students.”68 From there, Justice Alito expounded on the
potential dangers of school attendance, arguing that students
face dangers they might otherwise avoid in attending schools.
Parents, he continued, cannot provide guidance and protection
in the school setting, and students may be sharing close
quarters with other students who would physically harm
them.69 “Experience shows,” as Justice Alito concludes, “that
schools can be special places of danger.”70
Even though Justice Alito took great pains to say he joined
the majority only because Frederick’s banner did not include
any form of political speech regarding “the wisdom of the war
on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal use,”71 lower
courts have interpreted his lone paragraph on “special
characteristics” and school safety to allow for the censorship of
violent and homophobic student speech.72 According to
Professor Clay Calvert, “if Justice Samuel Alito hoped his
concurring opinion in Morse v. Frederick would be interpreted
narrowly by lower courts, he might not have written so
much.”73
Thus even if his intention had been to craft a narrowing
lens through which to view the majority opinion, Justice Alito’s
concurrence has been distorted by some courts to permit
more—not less—censorship of student expression predicated on
the notion of student safety. “[E]ven as the concurrence
attempted to contain the Court’s decision to illegal drug
messaging,” Francisco M. Negron argues, “it validated the
existence of a new standard premised on student welfare.”74
However, according to Professor Mark W. Cordes, when Justice
551 U.S. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 422 (quoting id. at 445 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
72
Calvert, supra note 66, at 9. Court decisions employing this broad, perhaps
unintended, interpretation of Justice Alito’s opinion include Ponce v. Socorro Indep.
Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2007), Boim v. Fulton Cnty Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978
(11th Cir. 2007), and Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (2008).
73
Id. at 9.
74
Negron, supra note 51, at 1227.
67
68
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Alito’s concurrence is read in its entirety it only “painted a
picture in which permissible restrictions on student speech are
the exceptions, not the rule.”75
C.

Justice Breyer’s Opinion

In his opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer stated he would
simply decide the issue of qualified immunity in favor of Morse
and avoid ruling on the merits of Frederick’s expression,
thereby dodging the tricky First Amendment issue.76 Even
though Justice Breyer was the only member of the Court to
devote serious attention to the matter, the issue of immunity
for Morse garnered an “unstated” unanimity from a fractured
Court, according to Kenneth Starr.77 Even the dissenters
agreed the principal should not be held liable for pulling down
the “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner.78
Justice Breyer first surveyed the majority opinion and
found it to be based on viewpoint restrictions, thereby “rais[ing]
a host of serious concerns.”79 He then pondered whether the
Court’s decision could be used to justify the censorship
regarding the underage consumption of alcohol, the medicinal
use of marijuana, or even “deprecating commentary about an
antidrug film shown in school.”80 Yet, even with the faults he
found in the majority opinion, Justice Breyer wrote that the
dissent, if adopted, “would risk significant interference with
reasonable school efforts to maintain discipline.”81 He
rhetorically asks, “[w]hat is a principal to do when a student
unfurls a 14-foot banner (carrying an irrelevant or
inappropriate message) during a school-related event in an
effort to capture the attention of television cameras?
Nothing?”82
Thus, the answer for Justice Breyer becomes the qualified

Cordes, supra note 51, at 674.
551 U.S. at 425 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77
Starr, supra note 21, at 14.
78
Id. (noting that the majority had little reason to reach the immunity question
once the substance of the case was decided for Morse. Starr had a familiarity with the
case unlike most—he represented Morse in oral arguments before the Court.).
79
Morse, 551 U.S. at 426.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 427.
82
Id.
75
76
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immunity defense, which requires courts to find for
government employees unless their conduct violates “clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”83 Morse is entitled to
qualified immunity, Justice Breyer argued, because she “did
not clearly violate the law” when she took down Frederick’s
banner, and her belief in the constitutionality of her action was
reasonable given the “complex and often difficult to apply”
state of student speech jurisprudence.84 With the qualified
immunity question potentially answered, it leaves only the
issue of whether Frederick could obtain injunctive relief as to
his suspension—an issue clouded by facts that suggest his
discipline was related, in part, to conduct aside from the
banner.85
Stuck between a First Amendment rock and a school
discipline hard place, Justice Breyer made his home in the
middle.86 He avoided, as he saw it, “a decision on the
underlying First Amendment issue [that] is both difficult and
unusually portentous.”87
D.

Justice Stevens’s Dissent

Justice Stevens, joined by Justices David Souter and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, began his dissent by pointing out Frederick’s
banner was erected as a means to gain television exposure.88
Since it was a simple ploy to gain the attention of television
cameras and not the promotion of illegal drug use, Justice
Stevens argued, Principal Morse would have acted to take
down the banner even if it said “Glaciers Melt!”89 Justice
Stevens wrote that he was “willing to assume” that
discouraging the use of drugs is a “valid and terribly important
interest” and that the “pressing need to deter drug use”

Id. at 429 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
Id. at 429–30.
85
Morse, 551 U.S. at 433. Justice Breyer cites Frederick’s “disregard of a school
official’s instruction, his failure to report to the principal’s office on time, his ‘defiant
[and] disruptive behavior,’ and the ‘belligerent attitude’ he displayed when he finally
reported” as possible reasons for disciplining him.
86
Id. at 427–28.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 433–34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89
Id. at 434.
83
84
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supports the school district’s policy prohibiting the advocacy of
illegal substances.90 However, as he saw it, Frederick’s banner
“was never meant to persuade anyone to do anything,” and
therefore the student should not have been punished simply for
a view that the school found to be inappropriate.91
Justice Stevens then discussed Tinker through the lens of
Brandenburg v. Ohio, arguing that the majority opinion
“trivializes” the landmark student speech cases by upholding
viewpoint discrimination and that the banner falls well short of
Brandenburg’s standard of “incitement to imminent lawless
action.”92 As Justice Stevens concluded, “[e]ncouraging drug
use might well in-crease the likelihood that a listener will try
an illegal drug, but that hardly justifies censorship.”93
Justice Stevens, though, soon weakened in his resolve,
stating that “some targeted viewpoint discrimination” in a
school setting might be justified, as well as speculating that the
imminence requirement of Brandenburg might need to be
relaxed at schools.94 Even after he conceded those arguments to
the majority, Justice Stevens still argued that school officials
must show how Frederick’s banner interrupted the school’s
educational mission or how it prompted students to try illegal
drugs.95 “But instead of demanding that the school make such a
showing,” Justice Stevens wrote, “the Court punts.”96
Ultimately, Justice Stevens’ dissent turns on the
interpretation of the banner, much as Chief Justice Roberts
characterized his argument.97 As Justice Stevens argues,
[t]o the extent the Court independently finds that “BONG
HiTS 4 JESUS” objectively amounts to the advocacy of illegal
drug use—in other words, that it can most reasonably be
interpreted as such—that conclusion practically refutes itself.
This is a nonsense message, not advocacy. The Court’s feeble
effort to divine its hidden meaning is strong evidence of

90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Id.
Morse, 551 U.S. at 434–35.
Id. (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 at 449.).
Id. at 438.
Id. at 439.
Id. at 439–41.
Id. at 441.
See Morse, 551 U.S. at 409.
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that.98

While admitting, “some high school students . . . are dumb,”
Justice Stevens nevertheless concluded that Frederick’s banner
could not prompt other students to try drugs.99 Even if the
banner is framed as pro-drug advocacy, Justice Stevens argued,
the message was “at best subtle and ambiguous,” and it should
be framed in a way to benefit Frederick, the speaker, and not
any audience.100 Justice Stevens also found that the majority’s
“ham-handed, categorical approach” might lead to the
censorship of speech regarding the legalization of drugs in
addition to the use of alcohol by minors.101
Justice Stevens concluded by observing how American
attitudes slowly shifted against both the Vietnam War and
Prohibition.102 Similarly, as Justice Stevens argued, the debate
on whether it “would be better to tax and regulate marijuana
than to persevere in a futile effort to ban its use entirely” is an
important national issue served by even “inarticulately”
phrased speech.103 In such a political debate, it is the minority
viewpoint that “most demands the protection of the First
Amendment” in Justice Stevens’ view. 104
While Justice Stevens’ dissent is at times blistering in its
assessment of the majority opinion, there is much agreement to
be found. As Professor Cordes suggests, Justice Stevens hints
at a belief that Tinker should be interpreted as allowing
viewpoint discrimination only where student speech would pose
a clear and present danger to the school, putting the dissent in
line with Justice Alito’s concurrence.105 Justice Stevens and the
other dissenters also agreed that Morse should not have been
personally liable for her actions in silencing Frederick.106 Still,
Justice Stevens “particularly lamented the abandonment of the
prohibition on viewpoint discrimination in schools and the
requirement of a showing of actual disruption to justify

98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

Id. at 444 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. at 444–45.
Id. at 445–46.
Id. at 447.
Morse, 551 U.S. at 447–48.
Id. at 448.
Cordes, supra note 51, at 675.
Morse, 551 U.S. at 434.
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punishing student speech” as Dean Erwin Chemerinsky wrote,
thereby conclusively setting the dissent apart from Chief
Justice Roberts and the majority.107
The contrast between Justice Stevens’ dissent and Justice
Thomas’ concurrence could not be sharper.
III. JUSTICE CLARENCE THOMAS STANDS ALONE
A.

Introduction

Justice Thomas began his concurring opinion by focusing
on Morse, but it soon turned to an indictment of Tinker and
student speech rights. He opened the opinion simply enough in
stating a public school may indeed prohibit speech it deems as
advocating illegal drug use.108 His next statement, however,
serves as a complete break from his colleagues on the Court as
Thomas declares the reasoning for his opinion: “I write
separately to state my view that the standard set forth in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist. is
without basis in the Constitution.”109 From there, Justice
Thomas uses a litany of educational history texts, state court
cases from the mid-nineteenth century, and appeals to the
doctrine of in loco parentis to support his view that “the history
of public education suggests that the First Amendment, as
originally understood, does not protect student speech in public
schools.”110
While his distance from the rest of the Court might render
his opinion otherwise meaningless,111 Justice Thomas’
concurrence is a fascinating look at how originalism, or the
doctrine of attempting to interpret the Constitution as the
Framers or framing generation understood it,112 is applied—or
perhaps misapplied—to a modern day problem.
107

Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 727–28

(2011).
Morse, 551 U.S. at 410 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. (citation omitted).
110
Id. at 410−11.
111
Cordes, supra note 51, at 673 (“Though the Thomas concurrence is quite substantive in nature, his position is so far removed from where the rest of the Court is at
on the issue of student speech that for all practical purposes his lonely voice is meaningless.”).
112
See generally Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and
the Interpretation of “This Constitution,” 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177 (1987).
108
109
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Originalism and Justice Thomas

While originalism as a means of constitutional
interpretation is nearly as old as the republic itself—indeed
members of the Framing generation argued “‘the words’ of the
text were to be interpreted based on ‘the general sense of the
whole nation at the time the Constitution was formed’”113—the
modern start for originalism began in the late 1970s and early
1980s.114 Originalism, as advocated by prominent figures such
as Judge Robert Bork and Attorney General Edwin Meese, was
positioned as a counter to the Supreme Court’s abortion
decisions and other expansive opinions dating back to the
Warren Court;115 rather than reading rights into the
Constitution via the “penumbras” and “emanations” in cases
such as Griswold v. Connecticut,116 jurists employing
originalism as a means of interpretation would apply the “rules
of the written [C]onstitution in the sense in which those rules
were understood by the people who enacted them.”117 Thus the
originalist is tasked with divining the original intention of
those who drafted whatever law is before him or her, a mission
that often requires the use of secondary texts.118 When
interpreting the Constitution, possible secondary texts as to the
Id. at 1199.
Derigan Silver & Dan V. Kozlowski, The First Amendment Originalism of
Justices Brennan, Scalia and Thomas, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 385, 388 (2012).
115
See, e.g., id; J,D. Droddy, Originalist Justification and the Methodology and
Unenumerated Rights, 199 L. Rev. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 809 (1999) (citing Bork as a prominent advocate of originalism).
116
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). In writing for the Court, Justice William O. Douglas
found a personal right to contraception through the implied constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 479.
117
Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 230 (1988).
118
See, e.g, Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,
60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 204 (1980) (defining originalism as “the familiar approach to constitutional adjudication that accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution or
the intentions of its adopters”); Ronald Turner, Was Separate but Equal” Constitutional?: Borkian Originalism and Brown, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 229, 248 (1995)
(citing Justice Scalia’s observation that originalism “requires the consideration of an
enormous mass of material, including the records of the ratifying debates of all the
states when the issue is one of interpreting the Constitution and amendments thereto.”). See also Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U.L. 1, 10 (2009) (defining the most ideologically strenuous version of originalism as the belief that “whatever may be put forth as the proper focus of interpretive inquiry (framers’ intent,
ratifiers’ understanding, or public meaning), that object should be the sole interpretive
target or touchstone”).
113
114
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original meaning held by the Framers include notes from the
Philadelphia debates and The Federalist.119
However, reliance on the relatively sparse evidence
surrounding the debate and ratification of the Constitution
resulted in critiques that the originalism approach resulted in
rendering most legal inquiries indeterminate due to the lack of
answers in the secondary text.120 Furthermore, where there
was historical evidence, it was often contradictory, as the
Framers often disagreed amongst themselves.121 An additional
problem, and perhaps the most devastating one with the
approach, was that it afforded the most weight and intellectual
importance to those drafting the Constitution instead of the
ratifiers—those with the actual power to give the new
governing documenting binding authority were thus an
afterthought.122
As a response to these critiques, originalism underwent
something of a rebirth, returning as an interpretive tool
focused on the views of those who ratified the Constitution at
state conventions.123 This “original understanding originalism”
soon ran into problems of its own, as Dean Larry Kramer
observed:
The indeterminacy argument became stronger, because
indeterminacy of intent was magnified by the expansion of
the number of individuals whose intent was to be considered.
It was not now a small group of fifty-five in Philadelphia
whose intent was to be considered, but rather a vast body
including every individual who voted on the Constitution.
Originalists found themselves trying to recover the
understanding of an exceedingly large group of people, a task
made even more difficult because different issues were
discussed from state to state. There were issues discussed in
Clinton, supra note 112, at 1214.
Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems With Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 907, 909 (2008).
121
Matthew D. Bunker, Originalism 2.0 Meets the First Amendment: The “New
Originalism,” Interpretive Methodology, and Freedom of Expression, 17 COMM. L. &
POL’Y 329, 332 (2012).
122
Kramer, supra note 120, at 909. As Dean Larry Kramer so astutely noted,
prioritizing the intent of the drafters of the Constitution instead of those who ratified it
“is like giving authority to a speech writer for the President. It is like giving authoritative weight to the intent of the lobbyists who drafted a bill for Congress, as opposed to
the Congress that actually adopted it.” Id.
123
Id.
119
120
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Pennsylvania that just did not come up in Virginia and vice
versa.124

This reinvention of originalism also encountered another
obstacle in the ratification debates as the debates in the
various states were concerned with whether the Constitution
itself as a whole should be adopted, not the interpretation of
individual parts of the document.125 Thus, originalism was
rebranded once more, this time as “public meaning
originalism,” the form of originalist interpretation that is most
prevalent today.126 Public meaning originalism focuses on
attempting to discern how the average, reasonable person
would have understood the language of the Constitution when
it was enacted.127 This average person for the purposes of public
meaning originalism is one “with the understanding of a
hypothetical reasonable observer, skilled in contemporary
grammar and syntax and fully informed about all pertinent
history.”128
This assumption of a reasonable individual in the time of
adoption is not without its own problems, as Dean Kramer
argues: “Any interpretation of original public meaning is a
wholly fictitious construct—a construct made possible only
because the person presenting it has not learned much about
how the Founding generation actually thought matters should
be handled.”129
Originalism as an ideological doctrine is also scrutinized for
both its close ties to political conservatism (given its
intellectual origins) and continued support from Justices Scalia
and Thomas, two notably conservative members of the
Supreme Court.130 However, as Professor Keith E. Whittington
Id. at 9–10 (footnote omitted).
Bunker, supra note 121, at 332.
126
Kramer, supra note 120, at 910.
127
Bunker, supra note 121, at 337–39.
128
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or
Are They Rationalizations For Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 8–9
(2011).
129
Kramer, supra note 122, at 913.
130
Silver & Kozlowski, supra note 114, at 388. See also Erwin Chemerinsky,
Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism as the United States Enters the 21st
Century, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 53, 54 (2004) (noting that, in contrast to more liberal justices such as Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan, “[t]oday. . .there are
Justices, such as Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, who are further to the right
than Rehnquist and perhaps any other Justices in U.S. history.”).
124
125
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observed, the issue is “not whether the public associates
originalism with conservatives or conservative politics, but
whether originalism is a rationalization for conservatism.”131
These lingering doubts as to the ideological ties between
conservatism and originalism are only exacerbated when the
Justices are inconsistent in their use of the interpretive tool,
thereby raising the specter of ideologically-influenced decision
making.132
Justice Thomas specifically has been accused of using
“originalism where it provides support for a politically
conservative result” while otherwise ignoring the doctrine.133
Yet supporters laud for the Justice for “his refusal to conform
to [opponents’] notions of orthodoxy.”134 These same supporters,
scholars and jurists who admire Justice Thomas’ use of
originalism and his willingness to spurn precedent135 see the
Justice as adhering to a personal philosophy that combines
originalism and natural law, the idea that there is a moralistic
source of law other than our codified statutes.136 In essence,
natural law is a “higher” or “unwritten” law that supersedes
the written law.137 As Professor Douglas W. Kmiec lays out the
relevance of natural law, it begins with the Framers drafting a
Constitution that “was to be informed by natural law embodied
in the Declaration [of Independence].”138 Those that ratified
both the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment had “no
131
Keith E. Whittington, Is Originalism Too Conservative?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 29, 29−30 (2011) (“[O]riginalism is a principled theory of constitutional interpretation and not merely a rationalization for conservatism. The association of conservative politics with originalism is not accidental, however, and conservatives are generally more likely than liberals to find originalism a normatively attractive approach to
constitutional interpretation.”).
132
Fallon, supra note 128, at 16.
133
Doug Kendall & Jim Ryan, Originalist Sins: The Faux Originalism of Justice
Clarence Thomas, SLATE (Aug. 1, 2007, 5:16 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2171508.
134
John S. Baker, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Clarence Thomas: Natural Law and
Justice Thomas, 12 REGENT U.L. REV. 471, 472 (1999).
135
Id. at 509–10 (concluding “As between a decision that does not adhere to the
Constitution and the Constitution itself, for Justice Thomas, it is clear which controls.
That obviously does not mean voting to reverse every or even many decisions with
which he may disagree. But for Justice Thomas, when judges go very far astray from
the Constitution, their decisions should be overturned regardless of stare decisis. That
follows from his view that judges should get the answer right.”).
136
Douglas W. Kmiec, Natural Law Originalism for the Twenty-First Century—
A Principle of Judicial Restraint, Not Invention, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 383, 385 (2007).
137
Baker, supra note 134, at 472.
138
Kmiec, supra note 136, at 399.

Nevin Macro.docx (Do Not Delete)

2]

IN THE WEEDS WITH THOMAS

5/28/14 3:46 PM

269

intention” of displacing this foundation of natural law,
Professor Kmiec writes.139 Thus, to Professor Kmiec, this gives
rise to “natural law originalism,” a doctrine that guides the
interpretation of the Constitution by “inform[ing] the meaning
of the more grandly phrased constitutional provisions” by
encouraging justices to not supply their own substantive
meanings where they would contradict natural law
principles.140
“Justice Thomas is a traditional natural law thinker and a
textualist,” argues Professor John S. Baker, citing insights the
Justice gave into his philosophy before his confirmation.141 As
to the scope of natural law’s influence on Justice Thomas,
Professor Kmiec writes that while natural law thinking has
been largely absent in Justice Thomas’ work on the Court, the
silence on this moralistic position has not been complete;
instead, as properly understood, Thomas has used natural law
originalism as a way to rein in judicial excess.142 Furthermore,
as Professor Baker states, Justice Thomas’ opinions “reflect an
understanding of the role of the judge and the principle of stare
decisis based on natural law, rather than positivistic,
principles.”143 This natural law originalism, as practiced by
Justice Thomas, “debunks legal realism—the notion that law is
merely will or what the judges say it is—and in so doing, it
helps elevate the ideal of the rule of law over the inferior
substitute of the rule of men,” according to Professor Kmiec.144
Id.
Id. at 400–401. Professor Kmiec outlines seven principles of natural law
originalism: “(1) that the human person has a created reality; (2) that while the understanding of human nature may be disputed, that nature exists independent of what we
may believe about it; (3) that as a foundational premise for forming a government, we
are created equal in our political status to govern, even as we obviously differ in physical or intellectual aspects; (4) that natural law, not the government, is the source of
inalienable rights; (5) that natural law guides personal behavior and is interwoven
with the common law and the statutes which often codify or “restate” common-law
principles; (6) that natural law is often stated at too high a level of generality to supply
specific answers, but as a background principle, it can be highly relevant to legislative
policy deliberation and choice; and (7) that while the same level of generality precludes
natural law from being the singular basis for adjudicative outcome, it informs the
meaning of the more grandly phrased constitutional provisions and should incline the
Court against supplying its own substantive meaning where doing so would contradict
the above.”
141
Baker, supra note 134, at 502.
142
Kmiec, supra note 136, at 411.
143
Baker, supra note 134, at 507.
144
Kmiec, supra note 136, at 415.
139
140
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Whatever may be the source for Justice Thomas’
originalism, it has generally not been received well in the area
of free expression by other members of the Court, according to
Professors Derigan Silver and Dan V. Kozlowski.145 After
undertaking an empirical review of all free expression opinions
using originalism from Justices Brennan, Scalia, and Thomas,
Silver and Kozlowski concluded that while Justice Thomas has
authored five majority opinions addressing free expression
during his time on the bench, none of his originalist opinions
garnered the support of a majority of his colleagues.146
Furthermore, seventy percent of his originalist opinions were
much like his opinion in Morse in that they were unable to
garner support from other members of the Court147—surely a
sign of his “iconoclastic approach to constitutional issues,” as
Dean Starr wrote in reference to Justice Thomas’ concurring
opinion in Morse.148
Outside of the Court, scholars and other critics have found
Justice Thomas’ originalism opinions in the area of free
expression to be inconsistent or applied in favor of conservative
policy preferences.149 In comparing Justice Thomas’ opinions in
Morse and 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island,150 Professors
Matthew D. Bunker and Clay Calvert found key distinctions—
namely the breadth of originalism and historical investigation
(Morse represented a “massive deployment of originalism,”
while 44 Liquormart used a “cursory, if not passing” appeal to
the doctrine) and Justice Thomas’ use of paternalism.151Writing
for the online magazine Slate, commentators Doug Kendall and
Jim Ryan examined two cases from the 2007 term, Morse and
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1,152 and Justice Thomas’ concurring opinions in
Silver & Kozlowski, supra note 114, at 418.
Id.
147
Id.
148
Starr, supra note 21, at 4.
149
See generally Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, Contrasting Concurrences
of Clarence Thomas: Deploying Originalism and Paternalism in Commercial and Student Speech Cases, 26 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 321 (2010); Kendall & Ryan, supra note 133.
150
517 U.S. 484 (1996).
151
Bunker & Calvert, supra note 121, at 356–57 (concluding Justice Thomas
was “anti-paternalism” in regard to the rights of adults to receive lawful information as
to the price of alcoholic beverages and “pro-paternalism” where the rights of students to
speak was concerned).
152
Morse, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
145
146
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both decisions.153 Justice Thomas’ opinion in Morse relies
heavily on originalism, while his concurrence in Parents
Involved, a case addressing voluntary school integration, is
largely lacking in originalism.154 In comparing the two
opinions, Kendall and Ryan found the lack of originalism in
Parents Involved to be striking:
It may be too much to expect any individual justice to be
perfectly consistent from year to year and across a diverse
array of cases. But here we have two public-school cases, both
involving the rights of students, and both decided within days
of each other, with Justice Thomas writing concurring
opinions in each case, concurrences that no other justices
joined. Don’t you think that someone, somewhere, might have
asked Thomas: “Um, so you ask what the Framers would
have thought about speech in school but not what they would
have thought about voluntary integration. Why not?”155

Given its intellectual origins, ardent supporters and
average conclusions, originalism has been—and will continue
to be—a source of controversy on the Court. Justice Thomas,
while not the only member of the Court to engage in the use of
the doctrine, has certainly been a prominent user of
originalism. Morse, in many ways, represents Justice Thomas’
quintessential originalist opinion—one, lone Justice using
sources to arrive at a position outside of mainstream
jurisprudence.
C.

Originalism on display: Justice Thomas and Morse

After stating that “the standard set forth in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School Dist. is without basis
in the Constitution” in his introduction,156 Justice Thomas
organized his concurring opinion into three sections: in Part I,
he addressed his view of the history of U.S. public education
and what it means for students’ free speech rights;157 in Part II,
he examined the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on student
speech;158 and in Part III, he restated his arguments in a
153
154
155
156
157
158

Kendall & Ryan, supra note 133.
Id.
Id.
Morse, 551 U.S. at 410 (Thomas, J. concurring).
Id. at 410–16.
Id. at 416–19.

Nevin Macro.docx (Do Not Delete)

272

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL

5/28/14 3:46 PM

[2014

conclusion.159
In Part I, and throughout the opinion, Justice Thomas
relied on a healthy measure of originalism, and he
demonstrated this approach early in the opinion as he wrote,
“the history of public education suggests that the First
Amendment, as originally understood, does not protect student
speech in public schools.”160 While Justice Thomas was not
explicit, he was certainly invoking the “public meaning” version
of originalism. Therefore, his entire opinion—and Part I
specifically—should be understood as an endeavor to determine
what the average person thought of the free speech rights of
students at the time of (1) the ratification of the Constitution
and Bill of Rights and (2) the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868.161
In his introduction to Part I, Justice Thomas wrote, “if
students in public schools were originally understood as having
free-speech rights, one would have expected 19th-century
public schools to have respected those rights and courts to have
enforced them. They did not.”162 Justice Thomas then devoted
his attention to showing how little the speech rights of students
were respected in the earliest of public schools. He did this by
pointing to the nature of education in the era before moving on
to discuss the doctrine of in loco parentis and school discipline
generally.163
However, what Justice Thomas neglected to consider is that
the nineteenth century was a time of change, including both
modernization and liberalization, for the American system of
public education.164 While his conclusions as to the
unenlightened state of schools could be accurate as to the
earliest colonial schools, by the middle of the century—and
definitely by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted—reforms were taking hold across the country that
would challenge the assumptions Justice Thomas made about
Id. at 419–21.
Id. at 410–11.
161
See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION (explaining argument that, to be applied to the states, the amendments contained in the Bill of Rights should be interpreted by examining their public
meaning at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted).
162
Morse, 551 U.S. at 411.
163
Id. at 411–12.
164
See infra notes 173–186 and accompanying text.
159
160
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the history of public education.
Justice Thomas painted a dire portrait of student speech
rights in the earliest American schools, as he argued
[d]uring the colonial era, private schools and tutors offered
the only educational opportunities for children, and teachers
managed classrooms with an iron hand . . . Like their private
counterparts, early public schools were not places for
freewheeling debates or exploration of competing ideas.
Rather, teachers instilled ‘a core of common values’ in
students and taught them self-control.165

Teachers, as Justice Thomas concluded, ruled with harsh
discipline. Students were punished for behavior deviating from
school norms of respect and proper etiquette.166
For the colonial era and the earliest part of the nineteenth
century, perhaps this portrait is appropriately bleak as
schoolmasters and others in authority often took the position
that “[t]he child’s original nature was considered to be evil,”
according to education scholar Herbert Falk.167 Thus children,
as Faulk wrote, were subject to instructional and disciplinary
methods designed to curb this inherent evilness as
“[r]epression and coercion were the methods of control used by
both school and society. [Teachers’] failure to accomplish the
ends sought was interpreted not as the inadequacy of the
methods themselves, but rather as an indication of inadequate
application.”168
Thus, a perpetuating system was created in which the
Colonial-era schools often sought to repress the natural
tendencies of the child by applying more and more discipline
usually in the form of “the rod”—meaning brutal corporal
punishment.169 These schools were distinctly unmodern,
choosing to obtain conformity “through rituals of repression
and even occasionally of terror.”170
This would mesh well with Justice Thomas’ argument had
the state of public schools remained static through both the
551 U.S. at 411.
Id. at 412.
167
Herbert Arnold Falk, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 48 (1941).
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Barbara Finkelstein, Dollars and Dreams: Classrooms as Fictitious Message
Systems, 1790–1930, 31.
165
166
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adoption of the Constitution and the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. Yet the middle of the
nineteenth century was far from static as the era saw
innovations in education as a broad coalition of civic leaders
reconceptualized the function of the public school.171 According
to education scholar Barbara Finkelstein, it was these civic
leaders and visionaries such as Horace Mann and others that
truly created what contemporary Americans would consider
public schools.172 She concluded, “[a]fter 1850, students in rural
schools no longer sat on benches around the periphery of the
schoolroom . . . . Grades supplemented whips, report cards
supplemented spelling exhibitions, and rewards of merit took
the form of dollar bills with the symbols of banking and
national progress . . . .”173
As early as 1833, reform advocates were promoting the
importance of play in a child’s development and the crucial role
of at least the mother in a child’s intellectual growth—both
ideas generally considered as modern innovations in
education.174 Antebellum reformers experimented with
different methods of punishment, including what would now be
labeled as “cognitive structuring” and “empathy arousing”
techniques.175 These same reformers also began the shift from
teachers as harsh disciplinarians to warm, loving authority
figures.176
As attitudes toward children shifted, so too did public
sentiment regarding corporal punishment. England recorded
the first public campaign against child corporal punishment in

171
Id. at 472 (“[P]hysicians, public school advocates, middling and high-born
women, labor leaders, and ministers . . . developed a conscious awareness of the influence of home, church, and neighborhood on the cultivation of moral and civic sensibility.”).
172
Id. at 472–73.
173
Id. at 477.
174
Caroline Winterer, Avoiding a “Hothouse System of Education”: NineteenthCentury Early Childhood Education from the Infant Schools to the Kindergartens, 32
HIST. OF EDUC. Q. 289, 300 (1992).
175
Myra C. Glenn, CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 138 (1984) (defining “cognitive structuring” as “the use of reason and suasion to convince a child of
his wrongdoing and point out to him the harmful consequences of his actions for others” and “empathy arousing” as techniques that “cultivate a child’s identification with
and sympathy for authority figures.”).
176
See Id.
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1669.177 Even before the Civil War, public opinion began to see
punitive teachers as cruel and tyrannical.178 The 1840s saw an
appreciable decline in the use of corporal punishment as
teachers began to shy away from its liberal use179 and apply it
only in cases of last resort.180 In one example, after a regulation
requiring Boston schools to record instances of corporal
punishment was enacted, the practice declined by twenty-five
percent, with some five hundred schools reporting zero
whippings in 1846.181 After the Civil War, New Jersey became
the first state to ban the practice in schools in 1867182—the
year before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.
While an originalist would perhaps cease the historical
inquiry with 1868 and the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is important to consider the direction of public
opinion at the time and how the national consensus was
changing,183 and that can only been seen by looking at strides
made shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification.
As the nation advanced from the post-war period to the mid1880s, corporal punishment tended to become less frequent and
was subject to more limitations such as documentation
requirements, the elimination of corporal punishment for girls,
and the implicit understanding that it was a last resort for
punishing students.184 By 1884, while the practice was still
legal in most areas, its frequent use was “fully understood” as
“a sure indication of weakness in a teacher” in at least one
school system.185 When the School Committee of Boston took up
177
C.B. Freeman, The Children’s Petition of 1669 and Its Sequel, in CORPORAL
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 41, 41 (Irwin A. Hyman & James H. Wise eds.,
1979).
178
Glenn, supra note 175, at 33.
179
Id. at 58.
180
Id. at 128.
181
Id. at 136–37.
182
Donald R. Raichle, The Abolition of Corporal Punishment in New Jersey
Schools, in CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 62, 62 (Irwin A. Hyman
& James H. Wise eds., 1979).
183
See Gerald V. Bradley, Essay on the Bill of Rights: The Bill of Rights and
Originalism, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 417, 420 (1992) (arguing against “snapshot” originalism because “[t]he Constitution is not a collage of photographs of early national America . . . [t]he Constitution is comprised of principles whose practical import changes with
time—as America changes—even as the principles remain the same. Indeed, many
constitutional principles, historically recovered, are intrinsically dynamic.”).
184
Falk, supra note 167, at 79.
185
Id. at 95 (quoting Quincy, Mass., Annual School Report of the Town of
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a measure to completely ban the practice in 1889, it was
defeated in part because the use of corporal punishment had
already appreciably declined.186
Considering these facts, Justice Thomas’ portrait of the
authoritarian landscape of U.S. public education is but halffinished. His historical inquiry as to the schools of the colonial
period might indeed be somewhat accurate, but it does not take
into account the changing nature of U.S. education during the
middle part of the nineteenth century—a key moment in time
given the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
With his investigation into the schoolroom complete, Justice
Thomas next turned to a key argument: that through in loco
parentis, courts upheld the rights of school administrators to
“discipline students, to enforce rules, and to maintain order.”187
The doctrine, as described by Blackstone’s Commentaries on
the Laws of England, is a delegation of authority from parent
to schoolteacher that allows the instructor to employ “restraint
and correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for
which he is employed.”188 However, Justice Thomas asserted
the acceptance of the doctrine by nineteenth-century scholars
and courts without sufficiently considering, once again, the
evolution of the education system in the 1800s.189
However, as many modern legal scholars argue, in loco
parentis is an anachronism in a discussion of compulsory,
state-run education.190 As Professor Susan Stuart wrote, “[i]n
loco parentis assumes a voluntary delegation of parental
authority and was envisioned during a time of either home-

Quincy, Mass., 1883–84).
186
Id. at 100.
187
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 413 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
188
Id.
189
Id. (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 441).
190
See, e.g, Susan Stuart, In loco parentis in the Public Schools: Abused, Confused, and in Need of Change, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 969, 971 (2010); Timothy Garrison,
From Parent to Protector: The History of Corporal Punishment in American Schools, 16
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 115, 117 (2007). See also Richard Howell, Note and Comment, After Morse v. Frederick: The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Takes Another Step Toward Abrogating the Tinker Standard for Student Speech By
Permitting Restrictions on Speech Which Posese a “Special Danger” to the School Environment, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 1046, 1049 (2008) (“The common law doctrine of in loco
parentis was found to be ‘in tension with contemporary reality.’”) (quoting New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985)).
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schooling tutors or small residential, private schools.”191 This
foundation, then, places the doctrine more in line with the
earlier colonial schools rather than the middle-to-late
nineteenth-century schools and the schools of today.192 As
scholar Donald R. Raichle stated, “[a]s the nineteenth century
progressed . . . . [l]ess and less was the American prepared to
surrender carte blanche his parental rights to the school no
matter what the common law might hold.”193 An 1861 letter to
the editor published in the (Thomasville, Ga.) Southern
Enterprise summed up the position thusly: “Parents send their
children to school to be taught, not whipped, buffeted or
scolded. They do not pay a teacher for doing these things, and
he who does them, commits a breach of the peace, transgresses
the law, and subjects himself to prosecution and
punishment.”194
Furthermore, the nature of the doctrine as applied to
student speech is troubling, as Professor Todd A. DeMitchell
wrote, because “[p]arental rights are not subject to
constitutional restraints, but public schools must respect the
constitutional rights of students.”195 Still, Justice Thomas used
the term in loco parentis a total of fifteen times in his opinion,
making it “clearly . . . the lynchpin for his analysis,” according
to Professors Matthew D. Bunker and Clay Calvert.196
For proof that in loco parentis was an accepted principle in
courts of the period, Justice Thomas cited197 State v.
Pendergrass,198 an 1837 North Carolina case that was the first
to adopt the doctrine in the United States.199 In Pendergrass,
state authorities brought criminal charges against a teacher
who whipped a child “with a switch, so as to cause marks upon

Stuart, supra note 190, at 971.
See id. See also Garrison, supra note 190, at 117 (noting that compulsory attendance laws made in loco parentis less applicable in the public school setting).
193
Raichle, supra note 182, at 67.
194
Letter to the editor, The Southern Enterprise, February 20, 1861.
195
Todd A. DeMitchell, The Duty to Protect: Blackstone’s Doctrine of In loco
parentis: A Lens for Viewing the Sexual Abuse of Students, 2002 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 17,
24.
196
Bunker & Calvert, supra note 121, at 348.
197
Morse, 551 U.S. 393, 413–14 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
198
State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365 (1837).
199
Stuart, supra note 190, at 975.
191
192
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her body, which disappeared in a few days.”200 The North
Carolina Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of in loco
parentis to remove criminal liability from the teacher, but it
came with a proviso—namely, that courts would continue to
review the teacher-child relationship even when discipline was
involved.201 “If [the teacher] use[s] his authority as a cover for
malice, and under pretence [sic] of administering correction,
gratify his own bad passions,” the court wrote, “the mask of the
judge shall be taken off, and he will stand amenable to justice,
as an individual not invested with judicial power.”202
As Justice Thomas argued that “courts struck down only
punishments that were excessively harsh,”203 he failed to truly
consider the extent to which courts of the period were willing to
intercede in the disciplinary procedures of schools. When he
wrote that in loco parentis “limited the ability of schools to set
rules and control their classrooms in almost no way,” Justice
Thomas swept aside the fact that there was judicial inquiry
into how teachers and schools disciplined students.204 The
Indiana Supreme Court took this responsibility seriously in
1853 when, despite ruling for a teacher in a corporal
punishment case, it wrote
[h]ence the spirit of the law is, and the leaning of the courts
should be, to discountenance a practice which tends to excite
human passions to heated and excessive action, ending in
abuse and breaches of the peace. Such a system of petty
tyranny cannot be watched too cautiously nor guarded too
strictly.205

Coming twenty years after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment but still important to understanding
the country’s evolving understanding of students, deference to
administrators, and school punishment,206 the Indiana
Supreme Court was called again to rule on an issue of school
19 N.C. at 365.
Id. at 366–67.
202
Id. at 367.
203
551 U.S. at 416 (Thomas, J., concurring).
204
Id.
205
Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind. 290, 292 (1853).
206
See Bradley, supra note 183. Justice Thomas himself does not limit the case
law inquiry to pre-1868 jurisprudence as he cites cases from 1885, 1888, 1890, and
1915 in addition to older, pre-Fourteenth Amendment decisions. See 551 U.S. at 414–
16 (Thomas, J., concurring).
200
201
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discipline in Fertich v. Michener.207 In Fertich, a young girl was
late to school only to find her classroom door locked as the local
district had a strict policy regarding tardy students.208 The girl
decided to walk home, and while exposed to the bitter cold of
eighteen degrees below zero, she developed frostbite on her
feet.209 The girl’s father sued, claiming that the school was
responsible for the girl’s injury.210
The Indiana Supreme Court considered many factors in
determining the appropriateness of a rule requiring that school
doors be locked to prevent tardy students from entering.211 “In
the enforcement of all rules for the government of a school,” the
court wrote, “due regard must be had to the health, comfort,
age, and mental as well as physical condition of the pupils, and
to the circumstances attending each particular emergency.”212
The court then argued that no rule of general applicability
should be enforced where that enforcement “will inflict actual
and unnecessary suffering upon a pupil.”213 In stating that the
practice of locking the doors on especially cold mornings was a
violation of this principle, the court concluded, “[a] school
regulation must, therefore, be not only reasonable in itself, but
its enforcement must also be reasonable in the light of existing
circumstances.”214
Thus, it is against this background of judicial inquiry that
Justice Thomas’ assertions as to the authority of school officials
to rule as they saw fit must be judged. While he argued that
courts of the eighteenth and nineteenth century readily
accepted the principle of in loco parentis,215 it is clear that
simple acceptance of the principle did not end judicial
examination of school rules and school discipline. Rather,
courts were willing—albeit reluctantly—to intercede between
students and school officials.
Fertich v. Michener, 11 N.E. 605, 606 (Ind. 1887).
Id. at 607–08.
209
Id. at 608.
210
Id. at 606.
211
Id. at 609–11.
212
Id. at 610.
213
Fertich, 11 N.E. at 610 (Ind. 1887).
214
Id. at 610–11.
215
It is worth noting that the first United States decision to adopt the doctrine,
State v. Pendergrass, does not appear in the law until 1837—some sixty years after the
founding of the Republic.
207
208
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After generally introducing in loco parentis, Justice Thomas
then cited a number of cases showing how the doctrine was
applied to student speech, specifically arguing that the
principle permitted the discipline of students for their
expression.216 The first case Justice Thomas pointed to on this
matter was Lander v. Seaver. 217 Lander is an 1859 Vermont
Supreme Court case in which a student was accused of
insulting his teacher after school hours as he was passing the
teacher’s house.218 The child was whipped at school the
following day. The child’s father later sued, arguing the teacher
did not have the right to discipline the child for something
occurring outside of the schoolhouse.219 The Vermont Supreme
Court, however, disagreed and found the boy’s punishment to
be just.220 Justice Thomas, quoted the following passage from
the court’s decision:
[L]anguage used to other scholars to stir up disorder and
insubordination, or to heap odium and disgrace upon the
master; writings and pictures placed so as to suggest evil and
corrupt language, images and thoughts to the youth who must
frequent the school; all such or similar acts tend directly to
impair the usefulness of the school, the welfare of the scholars
and the authority of the master. By common consent and by
the universal custom in our New England schools, the master
has always been deemed to have the right to punish such
offences. Such power is essential to the preservation of order,
decency, decorum and good government in schools.221

The court’s language meshes well with Justice Thomas’
narrative, specifically that courts of the period applied in loco
parentis rigidly and refused to interfere in the disciplinary
relationship between administrators and students. However, a
much more illuminating and prescient selection lies in the
paragraphs above the quote picked by Justice Thomas:
But where the offense has a direct and immediate tendency to
injure the school and bring the master’s authority into

216
217
218
219
220
221

121).

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 414–15 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859).
Id. at 120.
Id. at 120, 125.
Id.
Morse, 551 U.S. at 414–15 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Lander, 32 Vt. at
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contempt, as in this case, when done in the presence of other
scholars and of the master, and with a design to insult him,
we think he has the right to punish the scholar for such acts if
he comes again to school.
The misbehavior must not have merely a remote and indirect
tendency to injure the school. All improper conduct or
language may perhaps have, by influence and example, a
remote tendency of that kind. But the tendency of the acts so
done out of the teacher’s supervision for which he may
punish, must be direct and immediate in their bearing upon
the welfare of the school, or the authority of the master and
the respect due to him. Cases may readily be supposed which
lie very near the line, and it will often be difficult to
distinguish between the acts which have such an immediate
and those which have such a remote tendency. Hence each
case must be determined by its peculiar circumstances.222

The Lander court’s “direct and immediate” language calls to
mind the “material and substantial” disruption standard that
would be set by the Supreme Court in Tinker more than one
hundred years later.223 Furthermore, the Lander court cautions
that not all potentially disruptive student conduct occurring
off-campus would be punishable; rather, as the court argued,
each case should be decided on its own merits224 as opposed to
the reluctant stance of the judiciary characterized by Justice
Thomas.225
The Lander court would go to limit the application of in loco
parentis—or at least differentiate it from the authority granted
to parents to discipline children:
From the intimacy and nature of the relation, and the
necessary character of family government, the law suffers no
intrusion upon the authority of the parent, and the privacy of
domestic life, unless in extreme cases of cruelty and injustice.
This parental power is little liable to abuse, for it is
continually restrained by natural affection, the tenderness
which the parent feels for his offspring, an affection ever on

222
223

Lander, 32 Vt. at 120–21.
Id. at 120; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511

(1969).
Lander, 32 Vt. at 123–24.
See 551 U.S. at 414 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Applying in loco parentis, the
judiciary was reluctant to interfere in the routine business of school administration,
allowing schools and teachers to set and enforce rules and to maintain order.).
224
225
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the alert, and acting rather by instinct than reasoning.
The schoolmaster has no such natural restraint. Hence he
may not safely be trusted with all a parent’s authority, for he
does not act from the instinct of parental affection. He should
be guided and restrained by judgment and wise discretion,
and hence is responsible for their reasonable exercise.226

Justice Thomas authoritatively stated “in loco parentis
limited the ability of schools to set rules and control their
classrooms in almost no way”227 and “courts struck down only
punishments that were excessively harsh; they almost never
questioned the substantive restrictions on student conduct set
by teachers and schools.”228 However, as demonstrated above,
in loco parentis was not applied in such strong absolutes.
Furthermore, in loco parentis was not a guiding principle from
the earliest days of the country, like Justice Thomas argued.229
As the nineteenth century progressed, individuals were far less
likely to accept the idea that public school teachers had the
right to viciously punish pupils,230 a critical matter for Justice
Thomas’ “public meaning” inquiry into the free speech rights of
students.231
In Parts II and III of his concurring opinion, Justice
Thomas assailed the Court’s jurisprudence on student
speech.232 Justice Thomas first addressed Tinker with obvious
distain and argued the case extended student speech rights
“well beyond traditional bounds”233—before he explained how
the Court carved out exceptions from Fraser234 and
Hazelwood.235
Justice Thomas then concluded that Chief Justice Roberts’s
majority opinion simply created another piecemeal Tinker
exception, writing “we continue to distance ourselves from
Tinker, but we neither overrule it nor offer an explanation of
Id. at 122–23.
551 U.S. at 416 (Thomas, J., concurring).
228
Id.
229
See Fertich v. Michener, 11 N.E. 605, 610–11 (Ind. 1887).
230
See supra notes 203–213, 218–220, 231, and accompanying text.
231
See Raichle supra note 182 and accompanying text.
232
Morse, 551 U.S. at 416–22.
233
Id.
234
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
235
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); 551 U.S. at 418
(Thomas, J., concurring).
226
227
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when it operates and when it does not.”236 As he rather
eloquently and accurately summed up the Court’s
jurisprudence on student speech, “I am afraid that our
jurisprudence now says that students have a right to speak in
schools except when they do not.”237
Part III illustrated the melding of Justice Thomas’
historical findings with his criticism on the current
understanding of student speech rights.238 “In light of the
history of American public education,” Justice Thomas
asserted, “it cannot seriously be suggested that the First
Amendment ‘freedom of speech’ encompasses a student’s right
to speak in public schools.”239 He also reinforced his notion of
the breadth of in loco parentis by pointing to an example where
a court “refused to find an exception” to the doctrine even
where a student concerned with a potential fire hazard
criticized school administrators.240 Before concluding his
opinion with yet another attack on Tinker, he succinctly stated
both his core argument and the central, damning issue with his
stance and methodology:
To be sure, our educational system faces administrative and
pedagogical challenges different from those faced by 19thcentury schools. And the idea of treating children as though it
were still the 19th century would find little support today.
But I see no constitutional imperative requiring public schools
to allow all student speech. Parents decide whether to send
their children to public schools. If parents do not like the
rules imposed by those schools, they can seek redress in
school boards or legislatures; they can send their children to
private schools or homeschool them; or they can simply move.
Whatever rules apply to student speech in public schools,
those rules can be challenged by parents in the political
process.241

Justice Thomas agreed that the current system of U.S.
education is inherently and fundamentally different from that
found in the late 1700s and early 1800s—only after he devoted

236
237
238
239
240
241

Id.
Id.
Id. at 419-22.
Id. at 419.
Id. See Wooster v. Sunderland, 27 Cal. App. 51, 52, 148 P. 959 (1915).
Id. at 419–20 (citation omitted).
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a considerable amount of attention trying to prove that the two
are linked via originalism and the public meaning of the First
Amendment as applied to schools and student speech.242 By
stating such an obvious truth and then so swiftly brushing it
aside, Justice Thomas appeared lost in a dogmatic devotion to
originalism in applying the rules of the one-room schoolhouse
to today’s complex school no matter the differences.
Furthermore, if Justice Thomas’ “treating children” quip243
referred to the period’s practices of corporal punishment, he
was simply being callous in glossing over the details of the
cruelties dealt. Under various regimes of corporal punishment
used in early American schools, children were flogged;244 beaten
with canes, rulers, rods, fists and books;245 tied to posts;246
forced to wear burrs strung together;247 lashed for offenses as
minor as failing to bow at the entrance of strangers;248 had
chips of wood inserted perpendicularly to hold their jaws
apart;249 and made to balance on stools for “an hour or so.”250
Justice Thomas’ opinion, to some extent, is based on the
“greater-includes-the-lesser” argument,251 meaning that if
schools had unquestioned authority to inflict harsh corporal
punishment upon students in the eighteenth and nineteen
centuries, then certainly they have the ability today to simply
silence student speech. This certainly ignores the vastly
different conditions in today’s schools, but, more importantly, it
in essence celebrates an almost unlimited capacity for cruelty
toward the youngest and most vulnerable in society. Thus, at

See id. at 410–19.
See id. at 419 (“To be sure, our educational system faces administrative and
pedagogical challenges different from those faced by 19th-century schools. And the idea
of treating children as though it were still the 19th century would find little support
today.”). See also note 245 and accompanying text, infra.
244
Falk, supra note 167, at 48.
245
Id. at 54 (“Historians are in agreement that cruel punishments were the
rule.”).
246
Id. at 55.
247
John Manning, Discipline in the Good Old Days, in CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 50, 51 (Irwin A. Hyman & James H. Wise eds., 1979).
248
Id. at 52.
249
Id. at 59.
250
Id.
251
See generally Michael Herz, Justice Byron White and the Argument that the
Greater Includes the Lesser, 1994 B.Y.U.L. REV. 227 (1994) (explaining the argument
and associated logical fallacies).
242
243
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least from a moral perspective, the corporal punishment from
this era should never be used to justify any legal argument—
aside from perhaps a call for more judicial scrutiny of school
administrators.
Justice Thomas only compounded the matter by suggesting
those unhappy with school policies could simply work through
the democratic process for better outcomes. Certainly in an
ideal world, students and their parents would be able to work
for change in local districts, but we live in something far short
of that lofty goal. Student speech cases—be it war protest arm
bands in Tinker,252 stories in a high school newspaper that
make administrators squirm in Hazelwood,253 or the banner in
Morse254—arise when a speaker is voicing an unpopular and
minority opinion, and thereby making traditional democratic
advocacy routes unlikely avenues for success.
Offering that individuals can simply leave the jurisdiction
is also an unhelpful and dubious suggestion. For most parents
and students, private schooling represents a host of difficult
expenses and leaving a school district is simply not an option—
to say nothing of the complete implausibility of homeschooling
for most. Logistics aside, asking an individual to move to the
next town over should never be a serious answer to illegitimate
treatment.255
By casting aside the actual concerns and realities of the
modern educational system in favor of his own dogmatic
application of rules favored in the colonial era and gone by the
turn of the twentieth century, Justice Thomas showed himself
to be out of step with the rest of the Court and many in the
mainstream legal community. Yet his opinion, by virtue of it
being given the weight of the highest court in the land, matters
despite its flaws and outrageous conclusion.
Originalism as an ideal, as touted by Justice Thomas and
others, is noble as it claims a faithfulness to the original text
that modern interpretations dispense with. But originalism in
practice is something entirely different and more subjective
than any proponent would care to admit.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 263.
254
Morse, 551 U.S. at 396.
255
See Douglas Laycock, Voting with Your Feet Is No Substitute for Constitutional Rights, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 29, 30 (2009).
252
253
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IV. CONCLUSION
Even if Justice Thomas’ opinion never commands a
majority of the Court—and there are no signs it ever will—his
views on student speech and how he came to shape those views
still matter. Unless the Justice has some type of seismic
conversion in the way of his thinking on the issue, school
administrators will have at least one vote in their pocket when
they come to the Supreme Court looking to silence a student
speaker. Justices Alito and Kennedy, while they sided with
Morse and despite whatever accidental damage they may have
done to student speech rights, at least came to their decision
honestly and thoughtfully. In future cases, they could be
swayed on student speakers advocating a political message. Yet
neither the message nor the merits would matter to Justice
Thomas.
Justice Thomas’ originalism in Morse, is a subjective
inquiry wrapped in the gleam of objective historical analysis.
Justice Thomas believes that the history of public education
supports the notion that children were not expected to have a
constitutional right of expression, and he found evidence to
support that position in the historical record. The record also
supports the notion that courts were not simply willing to let
school administrators set whatever policies they wished
without some level of inquiry and that teachers were not
allowed to exert the full measure of parental authority over
students. Justice Thomas ignores the changing nature of the
nineteenth century public school system, eschewing facts in
favor of a radical result that would overturn the settled law of
Tinker.
There is no sin in believing student expression to be
dangerous or disruptive. The sin arises in the intellectual
dishonesty used to give that fear legitimacy.

